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INTRODUCTION 
As Felstiner, Abel and Sarat observed 35 years ago, the first step in the process of creating 
a legal dispute which is also to say, the first step in potentially claiming a right is in managing 
to name the category of harm in question.1 Despite substantial developments in human rights law 
and international criminal law over the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, however, our ability to 
consistently, universally and adequately name large-scale rights violations according to a clear set 
of criteria remains a matter of dispute. This is not only the case in some of the more dramatic and 
apparent instances of widespread and systematic integrity rights violations, but also, and in a 
potentially more troubling way, relative to many more mundane and constitutive components of the 
legal and practical environments in which we all live. 
This paper attempts to make progress towards the coherent naming of such large scale and 
serious situations of violation. In doing so, it turns to the notion of crimes against humanity. This 
will, to those familiar with the term, likely be surprising. As Norman Geras puts it at the beginning 
of his book on crimes against humanity 
What is a crime against humanity? In the literature about this, which has 
accumulated during more than half a century, it has become commonplace that 
the content and boundaries of the idea have been imprecise. They were so from 
the very beginning. Hannah Arendt was reflecting a common view when she 
wrote that the judges at Nuremberg had left the new crime in a tantalizing state 
                                                                
 J.S.D. Candidate, 2018, New York University School of Law; J.D., 2012, New York University School of Law. 
1  William Felstiner, Richard Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, 
Blaming, Claiming…, 15 LAW AND SOC. REV. 631, 635 (1981). 
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of ambiguity . Its subsequent evolution, too, has not been orderly , as is not 
altogether surprising for what began life as a concept in customary law. There is 
a wide scholarly consensus about the resulting state of affairs. While crimes 
against humanity are clearly enshrined today in customary international law,  one 
commentator has said, their precise definition is not free of doubt . The scope 
of crimes against humanity , writes another, is difficult to determine 
precisely . Yet others speak of the term as shrouded in ambiguity , its definition 
as notoriously elusive , a situation of chronic definitional confusion .2
Crimes against humanity,  in other words, is about as problematic a concept as possible 
from which to launch an attempt to clarify the legal classification of situations of mass violation. 
The first source of confusion lies in the double nature of the test required by the term. In the first 
place, the existence of a situation of crimes against humanity must be shown; once that has been 
established, individual liability for crimes may be pursued. Even when this is understood, however, 
contestation over exactly how to understand situations of crimes against humanity, together with 
uncertainty over the extent of harm necessary in order for a factual situation to rise to such a level, 
further complicate the area. The caution in the manner in which the term is employed that is 
engendered by such uncertainty is further magnified by the term s link to the criminal context, in 
which defendants are rightly protected from overly quick condemnation, as well as by its link to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), which combines unique authority on such matters with 
structural grounds for caution. Thus, it is no surprise that statements referring to situations of crimes 
against humanity employ tentative language almost as a matter of course, as illustrated for instance 
by a recent report by the United Nations (UN) on Eritrea, which stated that violations there may
constitute crimes against humanity 3 despite the fact that, on any plausible reading of the term, it 
is abundantly clear that they do. 
There are three reasons why this paper nonetheless begins with the term crimes against 
humanity in its efforts to develop a clarified classificatory schema. In the first place, crimes against 
humanity  is simply the existing generalizable4 terminology applicable to at least a particular subset 
of the worst instances of mass rights violation. Given the importance of maintaining a unified set 
                                                                
2  NORMAN GERAS, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: BIRTH OF A CONCEPT vii (2011) (citing Darryl Robinson, 
Defining ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT L L. 43, 44 (1999), Yoram Dinstein, Crimes 
Against Humanity, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF KRZYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI 891, 896 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996), Phyllis Hwang, Defining Crimes Against Humanity 
in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 22 FORDHAM INT L L. J. 457, 487 (1998), Diane Orentlicher, 
Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2585 
(1991), Margaret deGuzman, The Road from Rome: The Developing Law of Crimes Against Humanity, 22 HUM. RTS.
Q. 335, 336 (2000), and Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence,
37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT L L. 787, 790-91 (1999)). A variety of overlapping factors
development, its history of ties to war crimes, the link to criminality, a history of major world powers imposing one-sided 
justice on the defeated and the potential necessity of international jurisdiction could all be cited as factors that have 
contributed to the convoluted and unclear nature and uneven application of the term. 
3 of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea, Human Rights Council, Twenty-Ninth Session, 
¶ 66, U.N. Doc A/HRC/29/42 (June 4, 2015) (emphasis added). The cautious language in such instance is yet further over-
determined, of course, by the structural factors underpinning UN caution generally. 
4  I.e. excluding the weightier, but definitionally more specific, not to mention even more contested, category 
of genocide. 
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of terminology, it is important that existing terminology be employed.5 In the second place, the 
crimes against humanity label carries with it an already clearly recognized hefty weight of 
normative condemnation. Finally, despite the lack of clarity regarding situations of crimes against 
humanity in the international criminal law realm, the term is still better defined than any comparable 
term to have developed purely within human rights law.6
The ambiguity of the concept of crimes against humanity means that a necessary first step 
in the process of producing a clear definition of the term, as Geras has recognized, must be to 
conduct a reconstruction of the term. Performing such a reconstruction is not a task that can be 
accomplished in a vacuum or on the basis of formalist principles rather, like all interpretation, 
such a reconstruction can only be accomplished with reference to guiding principles, with greater 
unity and clarity in such principles leading to greater unity and clarity of interpretation. This paper 
proposes a victim-centered approach,  described in further detail below, as the central guiding 
principle in the light of which reconstruction should be performed. 
Part two of this paper provides a historical account of the development of the concept of 
crimes against humanity. While well-trodden ground for the initiated, this brief history provides 
important context for those less familiar with the idea of crimes against humanity. The history, 
moreover, helps to show certain ways in which the term has evolved over the course of its life that 
may be taken as signs of the influence of a victim-centered approach on the term s evolution. Part 
three of the paper introduces and discusses the victim-centered approach, attempting to lay to rest 
some of the major critiques and concerns such an approach might raise. Parts four, five, and six 
then perform the necessary reconstruction emphasizing the importance of thinking about 
situations of crimes against humanity in terms of responsible entities, situational parameters, and 
levels of aggregate harm. Finally, part seven addresses the importance of naming in general, maps 
out the parameters of the terrain surrounding situations of crimes against humanity, and suggests of 
clearer categories in such areas. 
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
A key early articulation of the idea of crimes against humanity came through the Martens 
Clause of the Fourth Hague Convention, which referred to the laws of humanity and the dictates 
of public conscience. 7 Another key historical moment came with the 1915 declaration by Russia, 
                                                                
5  On the importance of unifying terms, see David Scheffer, Genocide and Atrocity Crimes, 1 GENOCIDE 
STUD. & PREVENTION: AN INT L JOURNAL 229, 237 (2006); David Scheffer, The Merits of Unifying Terms: ‘Atrocity 
Crimes’ and ‘Atrocity Law, GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION: AN INT L JOURNAL 91, 92 (2007).  
6  The Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission include in the list of situations which merit 
inclusion in Chapter IV.B of the Annual Report  the Chapter reserved for the situations of greatest concern  situations of 
defined however. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2013 Rules of Procedure. The African Charter refers to 
ition is provided. African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, CAB/LEG/67/3 
rev. 5 (1982; entry into force: Oct. 21, 1986), Art. 58(1). 
7  Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the Convention Regulations 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, (Oct 18, 1907). The Clause appeared 8 years earlier in the preamble to 
the Hague II Convention of 1899; and in the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of 
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight. See Lindsay Moir, Crimes Against Humanity in Historical Perspective,
3 N.Z. Y.B. INT L L. 101, 126-27 (2006). On the importance of the Martens Clause see Antonio Cassese, The Martens 
Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?, 11 EUR. J. INT L L. 187 (2000). It has also been argued that slavery could be 
understood as a crime against humanity from as early as 1841. See Leila S. Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg 
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Britain and France that Turkey had committed crimes against humanity and civilization  through 
its actions against its Armenian population.8 While the Treaty of Versailles did not include a 
definition of crimes against humanity, but rather only of war crimes,9 a Commission formed to look 
into responsibilities for acts during the war found that Germany and her allies had violated the 
dictates of humanity  and the laws of humanity , making them liable to criminal prosecution.10
The 1920 Treaty of Sevres, signed with Turkey, explicitly envisioned prosecution of those 
responsible for crimes against humanity, understood to encompass massacres of Armenians in 
particular, but the treaty was never ratified and no tribunals were formed.11 Even though prosecution 
of crimes against humanity was not being pursued in practice, the concept was beginning to take 
shape.12
The need for an additional category to complement war crimes was recognized by the 
United Nations War Crimes Commission during World War II.13 When Italy surrendered, the treaty 
of surrender referred to prosecution of both war crimes and analogous offenses. 14 The key aim 
was to prosecute not only war crimes, which were only a part of the whole ghastly Hitlerite 
enterprise , but rather for the entire enterprise to be included in the trial. 15 The point was that 
but for the fact that the victims were technically enemy [i.e. German, in the most part] nationals, 
such persecutions were otherwise in every respect similar to war crimes 16 with motivation to 
create such a category being provided by the fact that the suggestion that Nazi persecutors and 
                                                                
Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT L L. 289, 
296-97 (1994). Schabas agrees, and in fact traces the term back to Voltaire. See William Schabas, Why is There a Need for 
a Crimes Against Humanity Convention?, 44 STUD. IN TRANSNAT L LEGAL POL Y 251, 261 (2012). 
8  PARIS, EDITIONS INTERNATIONALES, LA DOCUMENTATION INTERNATIONALE: LA PAIX DE VERSAILLES,
VOL. 3, RESPONSIBILITIES DES AUTEURS DE LA GUERRE ET SANCTIONS, Annex I (1930).  See also Leslie C. Green, Group 
rights, war crimes and crimes against humanity, 1 INT L J. ON GROUP RTS.
instrument, there were numerous references to humanitarian intervention prior to this in the doctrine of international law. 
None of these, however, suggested that there was a right to try as criminals those responsible for the acts which led to the 
9  Largely due to US skepticism as to the notion of crimes against humanity; see Memorandum of Reservations 
Presented by the Representatives of the United States to the Report of the Commission on Responsibilities, Annex II, Apr. 
4, 1919, reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT L L. 127 (1920). 
10 See Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT L L. 178, 180-81 (1946) (providing an 
 see also 
Lindsay Moir, Crimes Against Humanity in Historical Perspective, 3 N.Z. Y.B. INT L L. 
made by the Commission between (a) the law and customs of war, and (b) the laws of humanity is fundamentally important, 
and can be seen as reflecting the distinction between war crimes and crimes against humanity at N
11  E.g., Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey, Aug 10, 1920, reprinted in 15 AM. J. INT L
L. 179, 235 (1921); Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT L L. 178, 182 (1946); David Matas, 
Prosecuting Crimes Against Humanity: The Lessons of World War I, 13 FORDHAM INT L L. J. 86, 91 (1989). 
12  Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT L L. 178, 181-83 (1946). 
13 Id. at 184-85. 
14 Id. at 185. 
15  Lindsay Moir, Crimes Against Humanity in Historical Perspective, 3 N.Z. Y.B. INT L L. 101, 113 (2006) 
(citing U.S. DEP'T OF ST., PUB. NO. 3080, REP. OF Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International 
Conference on Military Tribunals (1945, released 1949) [hereinafter Jackson Report]). 
16 Id. (citing UN War Crimes Commission, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION 
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 174 (1948)). 
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exterminators had not violated the traditional rules of warfare was, however, simply impossible 
for the battered peoples of Europe to accept in 1945. 17
The first definition of crimes against humanity was provided by the International Military 
Tribunal in Nuremberg in 1945, which defined the term in article 6(c) as referring to 
[m]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not 
in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.18
As noted, the category of crimes against humanity had been perceived as necessary in 
order to ensure that prosecutions might not only reach crimes against foreign populations, but also 
crimes against a country s own citizens. The creation of the category was hence linked from the 
beginning to the idea of human rights as a category of international law, that is, to the idea that 
states have obligations not only to each other, but also to their own citizens.19 As one author has put 
it,
[t]he crimes against humanity charge confirmed that citizens are under the 
protection of international law even when they are victimized by their 
compatriots. Furthermore, the criminality of such acts whether or not in 
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated  established the 
supremacy of international law over municipal law. In this way, the prohibition 
of crimes against humanity at Nuremberg had the potential to irretrievably pierce 
the trope of sovereignty a rule of international law which provides that no state 
shall intervene in the territorial and personal sphere of validity of another national 
legal order. 20
It was hence perhaps in order to soften this dramatic expansion of international 
responsibility that crimes against humanity in the Nuremberg context were ultimately defined as 
fundamentally linked to war crimes and crimes against peace, or in connection with any crime 
                                                                
17 Id. at 109 (citing BRADLEY SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG 14 (1977)). 
18  Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Art. 
6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 287-88. The definition at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was 
similar, though it did not refer to the religious grounds of discrimination and was explicit as to liability extending up and 
down chains of command. On the nature of the underlying grounds in the Nuremberg definition, see Phyllis Hwang, Defining 
Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 22 FORDHAM INT L L. J. 457, 462-3 
(1998). 
19  On the relation between the concepts see HERSH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 36 (1950); LOUIS HENKIN, RICHARD PUGH, OSCAR SCHACHTER & HANS SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 986 (2nd ed. 
1987); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law in the Process of Protection of Human 
Rights, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORDER 193 (1982). 
20  Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT L L. 787, 791 (1999) (citing Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, Art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279-287-88 and Franz Schick, The Nuremberg Trial and the 
International Law of the Future, 41 AM. J. INT L L. 770, 784-85 (1947)). 
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within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,  as article 6(c) puts it.21 In fact, Jackson argued for such a 
definition in part due to his awareness that domestic patterns of racial discrimination in the United 
States could otherwise come to be addressed as crimes against humanity.22
One of the central legal debates around the idea of crimes against humanity at Nuremberg 
concerned whether or not prosecutions under that notion would run afoul of the notion of nullum
crimen sine lege.23 Some, like Jackson, argued that the prohibition was not violated since the acts 
in question were criminal by standards generally accepted in all civilized countries. 24 At the same 
time it was hard to deny, as one commentator writing shortly thereafter put it, that international 
prosecution under the notion of crimes against humanity must be considered a legal innovation of 
the first magnitude. 25 Ultimately, the tribunal claimed that the prohibition of ex post facto laws 
was not yet a matter of customary international law and hence the charges might stand, though a 
major motivation was clearly that the importance of prosecuting crimes against humanity was seen 
as greater than the importance of respecting such a principle.26
Likely due to uncertainty as to the legitimacy of prosecutions for crimes against humanity, 
the category was relied on in a generally supportive way at Nuremberg, with the tribunal cautious 
in probing the boundaries while it was willing to consider crimes against humanity committed 
before the first of September 1939 in the course of considering broader patterns, no defendants were 
convicted solely for crimes against humanity committed prior to September 1, 1939, and the tribunal 
was in general reluctant to find that the nexus requirement had been met in such instances.27  At the 
                                                                
21  M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 25 (2nd ed. 
1999); Margaret deGuzman, Crimes Against Humanity, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
121, 121-22 (Nadia Bernaz & William Schabas eds., 2011); Lindsay Moir, Crimes Against Humanity in Historical 
Perspective, 3 N.Z. Y.B. INT L L.101, 120-22 (2006); Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: 
Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT L L. 787, 791-2 (1999); Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 
BRITISH Y.B. INT L L. 178, 205 (1946).  
22 See William Schabas, Why Is There a Need for a Crimes Against Humanity Convention?, 44 STUD. IN 
TRANSNAT L LEGAL POL Y 251, 262- nexus formed part of a larger concern to preserve 
the traditional notion of sovereignty. While Jackson was opposed by Groos from the French delegation, Jackson won out. 
Even with the nexus requirement, however, the result was still a dramatic challenge to the traditional notion of sovereignty. 
Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT L L. 
787, 799-800 (1999) (citing Jackson Report, supra note 15, at 329, 331, 361).
23 See, e.g., BRADLEY F. SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG 14 (1977); BASSIOUNI, supra note 
21, at 18, 31. 
24 Jackson Report, supra note 15, at 48. See also BASSIOUNI, supra note 21, at 41-42; BRADLEY F. SMITH,
REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG 15 (1977). 
25  F.B. Schick, The Nuremberg Trial and the International Law of the Future, 41 AM. J. INT L L. 770, 785 
(1947). 
26 See ANTONIO CASSESE ET AL, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 354-55 (2002). See also Hans Kelsen, Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in 
International Law?, 1 INT L L. Q. 153, 164-65 (1947); BRADLEY SMITH, THE AMERICAN ROAD TO NUREMBERG: THE 
DOCUMENTARY RECORD, 1944-1945 86 (1982). 
27 See Judgment of October 1, 1946, International Military Tribunal Judgment and Sentences, reprinted 
in 41 AM. J. INT L L. 172, 249 (1947); Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT L L. 178, 205 (1946); 
Leila S. Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie 
and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT L L. 289, 308 (1994); Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against 
Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT L L. 787, 804 (1999); Lindsay Moir, Crimes Against 
Humanity in Historical Perspective, 3 N.Z. Y.B. INT L L. 101, 121-22 (2006). 
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same time, the Tribunal was relatively lax in finding the requirement satisfied in other instances.28
After the war, the allies incorporated an expanded definition into the law governing 
Germany, provoking challenges that prosecutions under the new standard conflicted with the 
principle of legality.29 Article 2(1)(c) of the Allied Control Council Law defined crimes against 
humanity as: 
Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country 
where perpetrated.30
However, in the actual conduct of trials under the Control Council Law, tribunal judgments 
split on whether or not the war nexus requirement was a necessary part of the definition of crimes 
against humanity.31 At the same time, the tribunal started to formulate a new limiting test focusing 
on acts forming part of systematic government organized or approved procedures amounting to 
atrocities. 32
Following the post-war tribunals, the international community at large recognized the idea 
of crimes against humanity, and the newly created International Law Commission (ILC) was 
charged with developing the concept.33 In 1950, at its second session, the ILC set forth its first 
definition of crimes against humanity in principle 6(c) of its Nuremberg Principles,  defining 
crimes against humanity as: 
[M]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, or other inhuman acts done 
against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious 
grounds, where such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in 
execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime.34
                                                                
28 See Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence,
37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT L L. 787, 805-6 (1999); cf. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 257 (1963) (contending 
that the ambiguity of the new crime category left tribunal judges with little guidance on when to charge the crime and how 
to properly sentence those convicted.). 
29 See Charles Jalloh, What Makes a Crime Against Humanity a Crime Against Humanity
381, 395-96 (2013); Control Council Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against the 
Peace and Against Humanity, Art. 2 (1)(c), (1945), reprinted in, 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL OF COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1951). 
30 Control Council Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against the 
Peace and Against Humanity, Art. 2 (1)(c), (1945), reprinted in, 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL OF COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1951). 
31 See Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence,
37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT L L. 787, 809-17 (1999).  
32 United States v. Altstoetter, Judgment, 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO 10 954 (1951), at  982. 
33 See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I), at 188 (Dec. 11, 1946); G.A. Res. 177 (II), 111 (Nov. 21, 1947). 
34  Jean Spiropoulos (Special Rapporteur on the Formulation of Nürnberg Principles), Formulation of 
Nürnberg Principles, 187.  U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/22 (Apr. 12, 1950). 
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Therefore, in its first definition the ILC went with the Nuremberg as opposed to the Allied 
Control Council Law approach, maintaining the war nexus requirement as part of the definition, 
despite the fact that this requirement might have been purely jurisdictional even from the 
beginning.35
By 1954 the ILC had yet another definition, this time presented as article 11 of its Draft 
Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. This time around the ILC removed 
the war nexus requirement, defining crimes against humanity as: 
Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or 
persecutions, committed against any civilian population on social, political, 
racial, religious or cultural grounds by the authorities of a State or by private 
individuals acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities.36
The new attempt proved controversial, however, due to the suggestions that discrimination 
should now be shown relative to all of the potential offenses, and that state instigation or toleration 
would be required.37
Little concrete work was done on the issue in the following decade, though the war nexus 
requirement was chipped away at by the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of the Statutory 
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and the 1973 International Convention 
on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.38 Thus, by the time work on a new 
draft code and definition commenced in the mid 1980s, there was agreement that the war nexus 
requirement was no longer necessary.39
The next ILC definition was produced in 1991, following the end of the Cold War. By the 
time it had arrived at this new Draft Code, now renamed the Draft Code of Crimes Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind, the ILC had hit upon the comparatively more objective formula of 
distinguishing crimes against humanity on the basis that they were committed on a systematic 
manner or on a mass scale. 40 The draft states, under an article headed Systematic or Mass 
Violations of Human Rights,  that 
[a]n individual who commits or orders the commission of any of the following 
violations of human rights: murder; torture; establishing or maintaining over 
persons a status of slavery, servitude or forced labour; persecution on social, 
political, racial, religious or cultural grounds, in a systematic manner or on a mass 
                                                                
35 See, e.g., ROGER CLARK, Crimes Against Humanity at Nuremberg, in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 195 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990); THEODOR MERON, War Crimes in 
Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law, 88 AM. J. INT L L. 78, 85 (1994). 
36
Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc.  A/2691, at 150 (1954). 
37 See Daniel Johnson, The Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 4 INT L &
COMP. L. Q. 445, 465 (1955). 
38 See Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence,
37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT L L. 787, 823 (1999). 
39 Id.
40 -Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/46/10, at 103 (1991). On 
the 1991 draft, see Christian Tomuschat, Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind and the Recalcitrant Third 
State, in WAR CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 41, 49-50 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1996). 
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scale; or deportation or forcible transfer of population shall, on conviction 
thereof, be sentenced. . .41
The renaming of the 1991 definition is noteworthy, testifying to the clear recognition that 
crimes against humanity are a subcategory of systematic and mass human rights violations and, 
through that recognition, potentially opening up the door to expansion of the compass of 
criminality.42 While the renaming would not stick, it may yet come to be re-recognized in the future. 
Once again the next definition would go backwards in suppressing the direct human rights 
relation, in failing to recognize the widespread/systematic requirement, and in reintroducing the 
war nexus requirement. Article 5 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY Statute) stated that 
[t]he International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible 
for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international 
or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population: (a) murder; 
(b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e) imprisonment; (f) torture; 
(g) rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) other 
inhumane acts.43
While the ICTY Statute therefore linked crimes against humanity to conflict, as had been 
done at Nuremberg, this could even more easily be read as simply a jurisdictional limitation, rather 
than a substantive definitional component.44 This limitation flows from the logic used at 
Nuremberg since once again an international tribunal was being created, a bold act in and of itself, 
limitations would help to bolster potentially challengeable legitimacy. The Tadic decision of the 
Appeals Chamber affirmed that the ICTY Statute war nexus requirement was to be understood as 
limited because the Court made clear that it understood this component did not form a part of the 
                                                                
41 Id.; LYAL SUNGA, THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: DEVELOPMENTS IN 
CODIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 124-62 (1997); BASSIOUNI, supra note 21, at 189-191. 
42  It is also noteworthy and important to observe that what exactly would qualify as systematic or mass was 
unclear, with the o
The Definition of Crimes 
Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT L L. 787, 824 n.181 (1999) (citing Summary 
Records of the 2379th Meeting
it had introduced the new heading because 
[t]he common factor in all the acts constituting crimes under this draft article was a serious violation of certain fundamental
human rights. In the light of this idea and bearing in mind the considerable development in the protection of human rights 
since the 1954 draft Code, both in the elaboration of international instruments and in the bodies that implement them and in 
the universal awareness of the pressing need to protect such rights, the Commission thought it useful to bring out this 
common factor in the draft article itself and in the title. 
-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/46/10, at 103 (1991). 
43  Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827, 
at 6 (2009). 
44 See Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence,
37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT L L. 787, 827 n.191 (1999). 
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definition of crimes against humanity under customary international law.45 The ICTY also read in 
the requirement that the harm in question be widespread or systematic, despite the absence of such 
language from the Statute,46 which supplies a post-hoc judicial remedy to address the problematic 
initial drafting.47
Article 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR Statute) 
removed any such reference to an armed conflict, stating that 
[t]he International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons 
responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, 
racial or religious grounds: a) Murder; b) Extermination; c) Enslavement; d) 
Deportation; e) Imprisonment; f) Torture; g) Rape; h) Persecutions on political, 
racial and religious grounds; i) Other inhumane acts.48
The ILC adopted a third definition of crimes against humanity in 1996, as 
[a]ny of the following acts, when committed in a systematic manner or on a large 
scale and instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or group: 
a) Murder; b) Extermination; c) Torture; d) Enslavement; e) Persecutions on 
political, racial, religious or ethnic grounds; f) Institutionalized discrimination on 
racial, ethnic or religious grounds involving the violation of fundamental human 
rights and freedoms and resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of the 
population; (g) Arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population; (h) 
Arbitrary imprisonment; (i) Forced disappearance of persons; (j) Rape, enforced 
prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse; (k) Other inhumane acts which 
severely damage physical or mental integrity, health or human dignity, such as 
mutilation and severe bodily harm.49
In its comments on the 1996 definition, the ILC clarified that by systematic it meant an act 
committed pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy, while by massive it meant acts involving a 
multiplicity of victims.50
Of course, the definition incorporated in the 1998 Rome Statute contains a particular claim 
to authority. There, article 7(1) defines crimes against humanity as 
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) 
                                                                
45 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
46 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-
Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997). 
47  However, the ICTY also read in other unfortunate and unnecessary elements. See Beth Van Schaack, The 
Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT L L. 787, 828, 832-40 (1999). 
48  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, at 4 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
49 -Eighth Session, art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 (1996). 
50 See -Eighth Session, art. 18 ¶¶ 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 
(1996).  
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Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer 
of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in 
violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any 
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any 
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act 
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) 
Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; (k) Other 
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.51
Article 7(2)(a) adds an additional twist to this definition, which creates a number of 
complications. The Rome Statute definition does manage to minimize, however, the potential link 
to armed conflict,52 and to dispose with the potential necessity of showing discriminatory grounds. 
The progressive features of Article 7 are quite an achievement since Article 7 was developed in 
negotiations with 160 countries, and one might have expected the definition to be more restrictive 
than its precursors as a result.53
*** 
The history of changing definitions of situations of crimes against humanity demonstrates 
the manner in which the category has evolved dramatically and constantly over the course of its 
relatively brief life suggesting, especially given the ongoing contestations and uncertainties in 
several areas considered below, that further changes are in store in the future as well. 
The history demonstrates the roots of the idea of crimes against humanity in the context 
of war, but also the manner in which the concept has gradually and consistently transcended and 
broken with that framework.54 The history also demonstrates a gradual expansion in the sorts of 
                                                                
51  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
52  Though several states, including China, India, the Russian Federation and a number of Middle Eastern 
states argued for its inclusion. See Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the 
Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT L L. 787, 844 (1999). As scholars have noted, it is unsurprising that the war nexus 
should continue to find support, given that it provided a principle means of maintaining the idea of crimes against humanity 
within the war crimes sphere and hence the sphere of traditional international law and state sovereignty, as opposed to the 
more challenging sphere of human rights. See, e.g., Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial 
of Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321, 1333, 1989; Elisabeth Zoller, La définition des crimes contre l’humanité, 120 J. DU 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 549, 558 (1993); Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the 
Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT L L. 787, 846-47 (1999). 
53 See Darryl Robinson, Defining ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT L L. 
43, 43 (1999). 
54  However, accretions from the war context persist in the Rome Statute demonstrated in the references to 
weight of transitioning interpretation runs against them. Thus, one scholar has noted that the language of attack, for instance,
-Cattin, Crimes Against 
Humanity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT STATUTE 49, 54-55 (Flavia Lattanzi, ed., 
sic] unlawful 
act of the kind enumerated [by the statute in question]. An attack may also be non-violent in nature, like imposing a system 
of apartheid, which is declared a crime against humanity in Article 1 of the Apartheid Convention of 1973, or exerting 
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underlying violations that might be taken to add up to a situation of crimes against humanity, and 
the gradual development of a definition focused on the categorization of the harms in question as 
widespread or systematic, a test, that is, primarily concerning aggregate level of harm. Taken 
together, these developments suggest something even more fundamental a gradual evolution of 
the notion of crimes against humanity in the direction of what might be termed a victim-centered 
perspective,  as detailed below. 
II. A VICTIM-CENTERED APPROACH 
In the first place, a word of caution is needed the intent in referring to a victim-centered 
approach  here is not to make reference to the movement within international criminal law to ensure 
greater participation of and attention to victims, though those are aims with which this author 
sympathizes. Instead, the intent in this context is to emphasize a victim-centered approach  in 
defining situations of crimes against humanity meaning that the experiences of victims will be 
key to determining whether a situation of crimes against humanity may be found to exist or not. In 
short, such an approach will tend to clear away convolutions in the definition of the term that are 
not responsive to the harm being experienced by victims, leading to an approach to the term focused 
on aggregate level of harm.55 To adopt such an approach will not dissolve all complications, of 
course; it will, however, help to clear out much unnecessary definitional confusion, and hence to 
refocus discussions on crimes against humanity around core underlying issues present but under-
explored in current debates. 
The victim-centered focus is made possible by, and builds on, the strong emphasis on the 
importance of individuals already deeply embedded in the notion of crimes against humanity itself. 
As observed in the introduction, in and of itself such a principle is surely unassailable who could 
criticize an approach which foregrounds the situation of victims? The rub, however, comes with 
what such an approach inevitably minimizes. 
A version of this approach is recognized by Kress, who, drawing on Robinson, refers to it 
as victim-focused teleological reasoning. 56 Kress launches several arguments that may be taken 
as contrary to such an approach. In the first place, Kress critiques the approach on the basis that it 
                                                                
pressure on the population to act in a particular manner, may come under the purview of an attack, if orchestrated on a 
From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: 
Defining the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 5 SAN DIEGO INT L L.J. 73, 108 (2004) (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 
Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judg
belief that it might be understood as less restrictive in certain instances; see Darryl Robinson, Defining ‘Crimes Against 
Humanity’ at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT L L. 43, 50-51 (1999). 
55  As such, the definition of crimes against humanity proposed here is generally in alignment with that 
proposed by Geras. NORMAN GERAS, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: BIRTH OF A CONCEPT (Manchester University Press 
eds., 1st ed. (2011). 
56 See Claus Kress, On the Outer Limits of Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of Organization within 
the Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision, 23 LEIDEN J. INT L L. 855, 861 (2010); 
Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. INT L L. 925, 933-46 (2008). While 
supporters of a limited standard employ the lab
humanity, that term itself, including its understood pejorative connotation, is in need of radical re-thinking. Without going 
nking can be understood to encompass the gradual detailing of general 
standards, the working through of convoluted and contradictory norms and laws in favor of universal applicability and the 
principle of legality, and the evolution of standards to meet contemporary needs, rather than simply the loose notion of 
empty-headed idealism the term seems intended to conjure up. 
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conflicts with the approach provided by customary international law.57 Given the complexity and 
confusion in both the definition of the terms in question as well as the historical fluidity of the 
category of crimes against humanity, however, such an approach is less than convincing. Second, 
Kress suggests that advances in international criminal law should. . . not be initiated by the 
international judiciary but should rather be supported by a solid amount of state practice. 58 This 
argument is weak once again to the extent the state of the law is far less clear than Kress contends
rendering judicial acts in such area the typical and necessary resolution of confusion, rather than a 
form of judicial activism. 
Other opponents of a broad and flexible understanding of situations of crimes against 
humanity, such as Kaul and Schabas, devote a major portion of their attention to Nuremberg and 
the roots of the term, arguing in essence that the category should continue to be applied in the ways 
it traditionally has been.59 There are several reasons to disfavor such an approach, however. In the 
first place, such an approach fails to account for the development of the notion of crimes against 
humanity over the course of its history, as explored above. Second, such an approach seems to 
convert the particularity of original cases into the boundaries of the generality of the law that is 
understood to have been applicable. Third, such an approach fails to account for the potential of 
new forms of mass violation, which a flexible, harm-based approach is better able to take into 
account.60 Fourth, such an approach seems overly Western-centric (as is, one might argue, so much 
of international law), privileging the World War II model of state-orchestrated harm over hazier 
situations in which state and non-state actor violence may overlap and intermingle, which have been 
prominent in so many parts of the world in the post-World War II era. Fifth, such a conservative 
mode of interpretation seems out of place in the context of an area of law that was born out of the 
need to address violations as they in fact occur, rather than out of fealty to previously clearly 
established legal categories. 
At heart, interpreters like Kaul and Kress simply seem to favor a more conservative 
approach. The core question, then, is what policy rationales might counsel in favor of such an 
approach? Perhaps the closest Kress comes to addressing this question is his suggestion that since 
international criminal law goes further than human rights law in limiting state sovereignty, it is 
particularly important that it not be subject to progressive interpretation. In particular, Kress argues 
that international criminal law 
                                                                
57 See Kress, supra note 56, at 867-71 (arguing that customary international law supports a narrow reading of 
58 Id. at 873. 
59 See William Schabas, Is Terrorism a Crime Against Humanity, 8 INT L PEACEKEEPING 255 (2004); William 
Schabas, State Policy as an Element of International Crimes, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 953 (2008); Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 15, Dissent of Judge Kaul (Mar 31, 2010) 
60  In this context, it is worth pointing out that the expansion of the notion of crimes against humanity has not 
been occurring in a vacuum, nor has it been driven by abstract academic concerns rather, it has evolved as part and parcel 
of an effort to address the worst harms that are actually occurring in the world today. As such, it is important not only that a
standard that can encompass a variety of forms of responsible entities be developed, but also that the notion remain loose 
and open and able to evolve to address new forms of mass harm creation. Also emphasizing the later point on the importance 
of flexibility, see Alain Pellet, Applicable Law, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 1056-8 (Antonio Cassese et al eds., 2002); see also David Hunt, High Hopes, ‘Creative Ambiguity’ and an 
Unfortunate Mistrust in International Judges, 2 J. INT L CRIM. JUST. 56, 59 (2004) (arguing that flexibility in international 
criminal law is necessary for it to grow). 
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carries with it the competence of properly instituted international. . . courts to 
decide on the genuineness of national. . . proceedings, a presumption against 
immunities ratione materiae, a presumption in favour of universal jurisdiction, 
and a presumption against the power to grant amnesties.61
The suggestion that such characteristics are unique to international criminal law is quickly 
belied by an examination of the work of the regional human rights courts, however, of which all the 
same statements could be made.62
Once again, Kress does not quite manage to state what might be taken as the argument at 
the heart of his position that is, why a conservative approach should be favored over a progressive 
one. Extrapolating, therefore, and assuming that the exponent of such an argument is in favor of the 
application of the category of crimes against humanity in general (for if not resistance is far easier 
to understand), the core argument behind such a position would appear to be the backlash argument. 
In other words, if the law is pushed too far in a progressive direction, a backlash may occur, leaving 
the ultimate state of the law in a worse position than when the progressive push started. 
Even where it is most studied, relative to domestic court decisions, the backlash hypothesis 
is deeply contested. There is perhaps even more reason to be skeptical relative to the international 
realm, where at least where progressive interpretation is conducted gradually states are likely to 
adjust to new developments, rather than to challenge them. That rapid progressive change may not 
be possible should not deter one from advocating such change rather it should merely make one 
realistic as to the pace at which the change in question may occur. Finally, and perhaps most 
essentially of all, it should be recognized that the progressive changes in question are not strictly 
opposed to state interests in the manner that Kress seems to presume: first, because progression in 
the understanding of situations of crimes against humanity of the sort advocated here consists, in 
significant part, in reorientation rather than simply expansion; second, because expansions in the 
framework may be taken as in the interests of states, insofar as states are concerned as in fact so 
many are with addressing the worst situations of mass rights violation around the world; and third, 
because jurisdiction in international criminal law remains governed by the sovereignty-respecting 
principle of complementarity. 
Another significant concern for Kress and Kaul appears to be the limited capacity of the 
ICC. Such limited capacity is a fact; the response, however, should be a principled prioritization or 
triage, in which the court focuses on the most severe instances of violation, rather than an approach 
which refuses to consider some such instances on the basis of formalistic criteria.
The piece upon which Kress dwells, Robinson s article on the tensions within international 
criminal law, draws a different binary, emphasizing tensions internal to international criminal law 
                                                                
61  Kress, supra note 56, at 861.  
62  One might also observe, further to the point made above, that it is strange that Kress recognizes the 
sovereignty-limiting principle inherent to crimes against humanity, while seeking to limit its use to interpret that body of 
law at the same time. 
Kress is right, however, to observe that international criminal law has served to highlight an understanding that has been 
deeply contested in the human rights context  that human rights obligations should be understood as horizontal as well as 
vertical. Instea
approach, accepting and recognizing the horizontal component of rights violations. See Kress, supra note 56, at 860 (citing 
Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Organized Armed Groups, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW: ORGANIZED ARMED GROUPS: A CHALLENGE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 103 (Marco Odello & Gian 
Luca Beruto eds., 2010)). 
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due to its dual basis in both the liberal criminal law context and the human rights/humanitarian law 
context.63 While Robinson is careful to emphasize that he is seeking to highlight an internal tension 
and not necessarily taking sides, it is hard to read the piece without coming to the conclusion that 
international criminal law must do more to recognize liberal criminal defense principles. 
Those who follow such a reading might well be among those who criticize the approach 
at hand  they might contend that such a strongly assertive, progressive approach will do even 
more to undermine the already weakened system of rights for the accused. The position advanced 
here however is that in fact the opposite may be the case. In order to assert that an individual has 
committed crimes against humanity, two separate things must be shown the situation must be 
found to amount to one of crimes against humanity; and the individual in question must be found 
culpable relative to a constituent harm.64 A reconstructed and, in some ways, more liberal approach 
to the first question concerning the definition of situations may bring with it both increased 
normative pressure and expanded potential for other forms of sanction. It may then be possible to 
tip the scales in the other direction on the other side of the equation strengthening the rights of 
individual defendants at the individual liability stage of international criminal trials, now that 
criminal sanction alone is not forced to carry the full weight of remedial responsibility. 
III. RESPONSIBLE ENTITIES 
The first question that must be addressed relative to situations of crimes against humanity 
is what sorts of entities may be responsible for creating such situations. A victim-centered approach 
favors liberality in terms of the recognition of the types of entity that may be responsible. In this 
context, any form of entity to which responsibility for harms rising to the necessary level of gravity 
can in fact be attributed be it state, organization or individual should be recognized as 
potentially responsible for, or as partaking in, the creation of a situation of crimes against humanity. 
Arguments have, of course, been raised against such a position. Besides the more general 
arguments of Kress, discussed above, Bassiouni has aligned himself against expansion of liability 
beyond states, arguing, for instance, that when 
[C]rimes are committed as part of a state s policy, it is likely to produce large-
scale victimization. . . . [I]t is not the quantum of the resulting harm that controls, 
but the potentiality of large-scale harm that could derive from a state s abuse of 
power. In other words, when state actors abuse the power of a state, there is little 
that can stop them before they carry out their course of conduct against a civilian 
population. . . .65
The weakness of such a position is already apparent in the text itself. Bassiouni insightfully 
identifies a key component of assessing the gravity of a situation, dealt with further below the 
importance of considering potential future harm, and not merely harm committed to date. The core 
                                                                
63 See Robinson, supra note 56. 
64  In the crimes against humanity context, the situational gravity threshold question is of course contained in 
the requirement that the act be comm
65 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY 
APPLICATION 10 (2011). See also deGuzman, supra note 2, at 368-9 (2000), commenting on BASSIOUNI, supra note 21, at 
248-9. 
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emphasis remains on aggregate of harm and potential harm an emphasis in full agreement with 
the position adopted here. The natural result of such an emphasis, however, is that should an 
individual cause or have the potential to cause a greater amount of harm than a state might, there 
would be a stronger claim that his or her acts be understood to create a situation of crimes against 
humanity.66
One might also argue that limiting the potential for situations of crimes against humanity 
to be created only by the actions of states is a progressive choice since states are, in general, amply 
able to punish those they consider major criminals, it is important to retain the crimes against 
humanity category for state harms.67 A strong argument can be made in favor of such a position
that expanding the framework would allow states to divert attention from themselves. However, 
strong arguments can be made on the other side as well. Overall, such an approach would help to 
establish a common framework under which individuals, organizations and states could all be held 
liable. The potential value of such an approach can, for instance, be seen if one considers the 
terrorism context as consideration of state and terrorist crimes under the same framework might 
help to ensure state commission of similar acts is recognized as such, to create a more realistic, 
comparative weighing of the harm arising from such sources in comparison to other harms, and to 
ensure such harms are no longer dealt with by an isolated legal regime that breeds abusive standards. 
The Kenya case before the ICC is helpful for highlighting some of the complexities of 
identification of responsible entities in practice, and the value of a loose standard relative to 
responsible entities. In his dissent at the Article 15 stage in that case, Judge Kaul argued that it was 
not clear a policy could be identified to commit the violence in question, or that it could be traced 
to a single entity.68 Judge Kaul s decision could be critiqued on many levels one could disagree 
                                                                
66  Similarly, Schabas argues that the policy element should be maintained, due to the need to encompass 
more serious violations. See William Schabas, Prosecuting Dr. Strangelove, Goldfinger, and the Joker at the International 
Criminal Court: Closing the Loopholes, 23 LEIDEN J. INT L. 847-9 (2010). Once again, though, the key emphasis is on 
extent of harm, for which a policy or states-only requirement presents only a broad and vague cypher. 
The example of individuals often seems misleading in this context, since it is hard to imagine that an individual without 
links to what could be characterized as one sort of organization or another would have the resources necessary to commit 
harm of the requisite level of gravity. Should they be able to do so, however, it is not clear why they should be excluded 
from capacity to commit crimes against humanity. As others have recognized: 
Are there not forces and organizations whose powers might be greater and whose actions might be 
more extensive than those of certain countries represented institutionally at the United Nations? Care 
is required because other methods of total abuse of the human condition could equal in horror, albeit 
from other aspects, those of which we have just spoken.  
Leila Sadat, Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age, 107 AM. J. INT L. L. 334, 354 (2013) (citing Cass. Crim., Jan. 26, 
1984, JCP 1984 1120, 197 (submission of French Advocate Dontenwille)). The statement here still refers to organizations, 
but its logic is equally applicable to powerful individuals. See also Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation 
in the Republic of Kenya, ¶¶ 89-90 (Mar 31, 2010). 
67 See, e.g., William Schabas, Is Terrorism a Crime Against Humanity, 8 INT L PEACEKEEPING 255, 259-60 
(2004) (arguing that crimes against humanity were originally developed for atrocities that were not punishable by judicial 
authorities and not for terrorist groups); William Schabas, State Policy as an Element of International Crimes, 98 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 953, 974 (2008) (arguing that it is not necessary to define terrorism as an international crime because 
States where terrorism occurs can prosecute those responsible). 
68 See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 15, 
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with his reading of the facts, for instance, and one could bolster such a position by arguing for a 
loose standard at such an early stage in a judicial determination. The majority decision in the case 
may be taken to go even further, however, gesturing towards how entities may be defined as it 
might be taken that a finding of a situation of crimes against humanity would be found in such a 
case without responsibility being unitarily attributed to one particular entity, but rather to a web of 
interconnected actors and entities, unity among which consists of and is demonstrated by their 
commission of a unified set of violations.69 The case also demonstrates the close relationship 
between a loose standard and evidential questions with Judge Kaul s standard tending to shield 
the state, allowing for situations of crimes against humanity not to be found, despite compelling 
evidence of concerted violations, on the basis that the necessary internal working of the mechanisms 
of violence in question are inaccessible. 
Another hypothetical scenario may help to demonstrate the superiority of a flexible test in 
this area as well. Imagine a situation of cross-border human trafficking involving work conditions 
amounting to slavery. The activity would be driven both by corrupt members of the authorities on 
both sides of the flow of people, as well as shadowy organizations and individuals involved in the 
human trafficking business, and perhaps supported by a variety of corporations involved in 
obtaining and supplying the labor force in question. In such a situation, not only do evidential 
questions once again arise, but even if they were settled a problem remains insofar as the situation 
is created by a combination of actors at different levels. While states are involved in multiple ways, 
including both through the criminal acts of their corrupt agents as well as through a failure to 
protect, the situation on a whole is created by a combination of state and non-state actors. The 
hypothetical also helps to highlight the absurdity of requiring a state element in the creation of the 
situation as a core component of the definition as, should such component be found sufficient 
even on the state-centric approach in a situation like the one in question, presumably all the actors 
involved could then in fact be prosecuted, which is indeed the very point of the category of crimes 
against humanity. Moreover, like the Kenya example, the hypothetical highlights the fact that states 
are not unitary actors but instead consist of multiple conflicting groups and individuals, often 
primarily motivated by private interests once again counseling in favor of a more flexible 
approach. 
Finally, it is worth noting that in the war crimes context, the distinction has long since 
broken down with non-state participants in conflicts being recognized as potential committers of 
war crimes just as state parties  agents are, and with the situational test of whether or not a conflict 
exists being based on a factual inquiry. 
The position of the majority is the position a victim-centered approach supports  a 
position that takes seriously the perspective and understanding of those involved in and suffering 
from the situation in question. To recognize that a common responsible entity may be found in such 
a case is also to observe the close inter-relationship between determining responsible entities and 
determining the boundaries of the situation in question. In this context, it is in fact the second part 
of the equation, the problem of recognizing how the boundaries of a particular situation should be 
defined, that is particularly complex and vexing; it is to this problem that we now turn. 
                                                                
Dissent of Judge Kaul, ¶¶ 147-52 (Mar 31, 2010). 
69 See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, Pre-
Application for Summons, ¶ 22-5 (Mar 8, 2011). 
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IV. DEFINING SITUATIONS 
One of the most perplexing elements of defining situations of crimes against humanity 
concerns the definition of situations. This section will first turn to current legal standards in this 
area, exploring how reference to the policy requirement has muddied the waters. The section will 
then attempt to go beyond current standards to explore the hard questions at the heart of the problem 
of defining situations. Given the lack of attention to these issues, the primary contribution of this 
piece can only be to clear the field and to focus attention on such questions, in the hope that further 
definitional clarity may be achieved in time. At the same time, however, this piece attempts to go 
as far as possible towards developing a framework of thought through which to approach such 
issues, in the hope that this may provide a useful starting point for further explorations. 
A. The Policy Requirement 
Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute states 
[f]or the purpose of this Statute, crime against humanity  means any of the 
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack[.]70
Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute requires that such attack be pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack. 71
What exactly the policy requirement entails has never been entirely clear.72  It has, hence, 
been a matter of great debate within the literature, with scholars arguing both about the meaning of 
the term and the rationales in support of different interpretations. Primarily, scholars have argued 
in favor of a loose reading of the term, despite the more precise meaning the word policy  seems 
to connote.73 Among other arguments, scholars have emphasized that a loose reading of the policy 
                                                                
70 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
71 Id. at art. 7(2)(a). 
72 As Mettraux points out, from the beginning Maxwell Fyfe expressed reservations about the policy 
requirement due to its lack of clarity. See Guénaël Mettraux, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity and the Question 
of a “Policy” Element, in FORGING A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 142-43 (Leila Nadya Sadat ed. 2011) 
(citing International Conference on Military Trials, London 1945, Minutes of Conference Session of 19 July 1945, 
concerning the definitions of crimes within the jurisdiction of the IMT, reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED 
STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS, LONDON 1945, at 301 (1949)). 
73 See deGuzman, supra note 2, at 374; Phyllis Hwang, Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 22 FORDHAM INT L L. J. 457, 502-3 (1998); Guénaël Mettraux, Crimes Against 
Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43 
HARV. INT L L.J. 237, 270-82 (2002); Darryl Robinson, Defining ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ at the Rome Conference, 93 
AM. J. INT L L. 43, 50- -94-1-
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) for the proposition that the policy in question need not be formalized and 
might be deduced from the circumstances); Leila Nadya Sadat, Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age, 107 AM. J.
INT L. L. 334, 371 (2013) (emphasizing that the policy requirement was added to the Rome Statute at the last minute). See 
generally ROBERT CRYER, Håkan Friman, Darryl Robinson & Elizabeth Wilmhurst, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (Cambridge University Press, 2007); Matt Halling, Push the Envelope Watch it Bend: 
Removing the Policy Requirement and Extending Crimes Against Humanity, 23 LEIDEN J. INT L L. 827 (2010), 
https://perma.cc/697S-X22J (advocating for removing the state or organizational policy requirement from the definition of 
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requirement seems essential simply given the structure of the Rome Statute definition. Since it is 
difficult to distinguish the policy requirement from the systematic  requirement, a strong reading 
inevitably converts the disjunctive or  in widespread or systematic  into the conjunctive and. 74
On the other hand, a few scholars have also come down in favor of a stringent policy requirement, 
basing their arguments primarily on either a historical approach or on an understood merging of the 
policy requirement and the requirement that crimes against humanity can only be committed by 
states or state-like entities.75
Much of the debate and confusion around the policy requirement likely derives from the 
fact that there is in a sense a missing, implicit requirement in the Rome Statute a requirement that 
can perhaps best be referred to as the common situation requirement.  In order to demonstrate a 
situation of widespread or systematic violation, in other words, one cannot simply pick violations 
at random; rather, one must show that a common situation exists linking the violations and evidence 
one presents. Hence, some commentators have assigned the policy requirement this role, making it 
the criterion upon which unassociated crimes in the context of a crime wave are not considered to 
constitute a situation of crimes against humanity, for instance.76 The question, then, is whether the 
policy requirement provides an appropriate criterion under which to resolve such a definitional 
problem. The answer provided by this paper, needless to say, is no; rather than providing clarity, 
reference to the policy requirement has in fact obscured the difficult question at the heart of defining 
situations. 
B. Defining Common Situations 
The question of how common situations are to be defined has two parts: first, what sorts 
of evidence justify understanding violations as interlinked; second, how are the temporal limits of 
a situation to be defined. 
Determining whether violations are interlinked involves overlapping inquiries into several 
different questions. In the first place, unifying characteristics of the victim group may help to show 
how the violations in question form part of a common situation one might think of the situation 
of African Americans, for instance, or indigenous peoples, or of other identity-defined groups. In 
the second place, the violation itself may provide evidence of a connection where similar 
violations are being committed against multiple different victims by the same responsible entity, 
evidence exists of a common situation. Such commonality may in fact span considerable geographic 
and victim-class differences one might think for instance of problematic instances of the use of 
                                                                
crimes against humanity); Guénaël Mettraux, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity and the Question of a “Policy” 
Element, in FORGING A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 142 (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 2011). A loose reading 
has of course also been adopted by the ICC; see Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, ¶¶ 84-88 (Mar. 31, 2010). 
74 See, e.g., deGuzman, The Road From Rome, supra note 2, at 372 (citing The South Asia Human Rights 
Documentation Center, The North Americans Re-Write Customary International Law: An “And” by Any Other Name is Still 
an “And
75 See generally Claus Kress, On the Outer Limits of Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of Organization 
within the Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision, 23 LEIDEN J. INT L L. 855 (2010); 
William A. Schabas, State Policy as an Element of International Crimes, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 953 (2008). 
76 See, e.g., Darryl Robinson, Essence of Crimes against Humanity Raised by Challenges at ICC, EUR. J.
INT L L. BLOG (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.ejiltalk.org/essence-of-crimes-against-humanity-raised-by-challenges-at-icc/ 
[https://perma.cc/E4NL-29EV]. 
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force or surveillance abroad that are then brought home; or of policing practices applied on the one 
hand against dissidents and on the other against migrants and refugees. Third, where there is 
evidence that violations committed in different manners against different groups share a common 
motivation, for instance of ensuring authoritarian control, those violations too may be understood 
as linked. While the policy  requirement suggests a relatively conservative and limited approach 
to recognizing such interconnections, a victim-centered approach suggests a far more liberal 
methodology to these questions. 
To lay out such factors does not, of course, provide much more than a starting point for 
considering how to define the limits of situations, from which the infinitely demanding task of 
applying legal categories to concrete facts may begin. The greater the clarity around and attention 
to such issues, however, the greater will be the usefulness of future jurisprudence in helping to 
explore the best way of thinking about such parameters. 
The second question, as laid out above, is how to define the temporal boundaries of a 
particular situation.77 This question is even more vexed than the question of inter-linkages. On the 
one hand, as long as violations are interlinked, one might understand them as all adding up to a 
single situation, over the course of time. On the other hand, in assessing gravity, what is important 
is clearly the aggregate of harm committed within a concentrated period of time. As such, the 
question becomes, how are the parameters of such a concentrated period to be assessed? An 
arbitrary numerical delimitation (e.g. five years) would not do justice to the complexity of such 
situations in reality. Given the close connection to the question of aggregate harm and the 
consequent complexities of temporal position relative to the assessment of situations this question 
is delayed for the moment, to be picked up at the conclusion of the examination of aggregate harm, 
to which we now turn. 
V. AGGREGATE HARM 
Wherever one might land on the liberality of the victim-based approach, it has the clear 
additional merit of simplifying the notion of crimes against humanity and centering the factual 
inquiry as to whether or not such a situation in fact exists around the question of aggregate level of 
harm. 
A. The “Widespread or Systematic” Requirement 
The primary test of whether a level of aggregate harm sufficient to constitute a situation 
of crimes against humanity may be found, that has developed as a core component of the definition 
of crimes against humanity over the course of the history of the term, is whether the violations in 
question are widespread  or systematic,  with the understanding that only one such category must 
be shown to apply.78
An underlying violation will be considered widespread  where 
                                                                
77  The importance of this question has been recognized by the ICC. See, e.g., Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 15, ICC-01/09, ¶¶ 205-7 (Mar. 31, 2010) (utilizing a liberal 
approach to temporal scope). 
78 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-
for the Former Yugoslavia, June 12, 2002), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-aj020612e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EJ2W-7S4C]. 
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the inhumane acts [are] committed on a large scale meaning that the acts are 
directed against a multiplicity of victims. . . The term large scale  is sufficiently 
broad to cover various situations involving multiplicity of victims, for example, 
as a result of the cumulative effect of a series of inhumane acts or the singular 
effect of an inhumane act of extraordinary magnitude.79
The definition of systematic has been subject to more controversy. In some cases it has 
been defined as including a policy element thus Tadic states that a violation will be considered 
systematic where it is committed pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy. The implementation 
of this plan or policy could result in the repeated or continuous commission of inhuman acts. 80
Akayesu endorses this in stating that 
[t]he concept of systematic may be defined as thoroughly organized and 
following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy involving substantial 
public or private resources. There is no requirement that this policy must be 
adopted formally as the policy of a state. There must however be some kind of 
preconceived plan or policy.81
The Kunarac Appeals Chamber judgment, on the other hand, states that 
[t]he phrase systematic  refers to the organized nature of the acts of violence 
and the improbability of their random occurrence . The Trial Chamber correctly 
noted that patterns of crimes that is the non-accidental repetition of similar 
criminal conduct on a regular basis are a common expression of such systematic 
occurrence  . . neither the attack nor the acts of the accused need to be supported 
by any form of policy  or plan  . . It may be useful in establishing that the 
attack was directed against a civilian population and that it was widespread or 
systematic (especially the latter) to show that there was in fact a policy or plan, 
but it may be possible to prove these things by reference to other matters.82
                                                                
79 -Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, at 47 (1996), 
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_51_10.pdf&lang=EFSXP [https://perma.cc/5ZRW-
YAL2]; see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber May 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/CC3A-MLH9]. 
80 -Eighth Session, UN Doc A/51/10, at 47 (1996), 
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_51_10.pdf&lang=EFSXP [https://perma.cc/5ZRW-
YAL2]; see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber May 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/CC3A-MLH9]. 
81  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-
1998), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-aj020612e.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG9F-B33Q]. 
82  Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-
Former Yugoslavia, June 12, 2002), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CC3A-MLH9]. As the tribunal starts to recognize in the judgment, the difference between the two 
standards is perhaps best understood as a matter of evidence. See, BASSIOUNI, supra note 21, at 196-99. The result of the 
Kunarac decision, therefore, is that systematicity can be shown either by showing intent, or by showing pattern or practice. 
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That widespread harms may ground a finding of sufficient gravity of aggregate harm is 
unsurprising. Where harms are widespread, moreover, the systematic nature of the harms in 
question may be presumed. Why should systematic harm, that one cannot also show to be 
widespread, also be taken as evidence of a situation of sufficient gravity however? Two rationales 
present themselves. In the first place, evidentiary issues are frequently very challenging in the 
context of demonstrating major rights violations. As such, pointing to the systematic nature of 
harms may be taken as a way of suggesting that the harms in question extend beyond what can 
otherwise be shown. In the second place and uniquely to the assessment of ongoing situations of 
violation demonstrating the systematic nature of the harm in question may be taken, together with 
assessment of the capacity of the responsible entity,83 as strong grounds to fear for extensive further 
violations of the sort in question. This prompts an assessment of the situation from a 
contemporaneous perspective as one amounting to one of crimes against humanity on the basis in 
part of the potential of future harm. 
B. Underlying Harms 
Only certain sorts of violations have been taken as significant in terms of determining 
whether a situation of crimes against humanity exists. Primarily, these are what might be classified 
as integrity rights violations harms to life and limb and forms of physical violence and coercion
killings, torture, rape, slavery, and so on. 
While a certain magnitude of such integrity harms would seem to constitute an essential 
component of situations of crimes against humanity, the definition of the term to date may be taken 
to go beyond such purely integrity harms as well. The Rome Statute list, provided above, is the 
most comprehensive to date. Several terms within that list specifically [i]mprisonment or other 
severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law[,]
apartheid, [o]ther inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health[,]  and persecution all appear to push the 
boundaries beyond the integrity rights realm.84
First, the Rome Statute refers to [i]mprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical 
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law[.] 85 While on the one hand, 
imprisonment constitutes a form of physical coercion and an integrity harm, it also quickly presents 
a much more complicated issue, as determining whether or not the deprivation of liberty in question 
violates the fundamental rules of international law will quickly come to involve an extensive 
assessment of both a country s penal code and the manner in which its justice system functions in 
the criminal realm in general. Inclusion of such a form of violation alone converts potential 
application of the Rome Statute from coverage only of situations involving massive physical 
violence to situations of mass and unjust criminal and prison systems as well. 
On a more general level, such a focus helps to shift one s imagination of the sorts of 
situations which might come to be classified as situations of crimes against humanity with the 
category now encompassing more clearly repressive, authoritarian regimes or states that apply 
such regimes to particular components of their population as well as situations involving 
excessive levels of physical violence. The category of apartheid too internally complex to go into 
in detail here clearly helps to shift the overall potential focus of situations of crimes against 
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84  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
85 Id.
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humanity in this direction as well, focused, as it is, on a situation of overall political discrimination 
and inequality. 
The catch-all clause of the Rome Statute, referring to [o]ther inhumane acts[,]  provides 
another basis for a potentially broad understanding of those crimes that constitute crimes against 
humanity.86 The definition provided by the ICTY and ICTR to such a term was broad, understanding 
serious attacks on human dignity, as well as acts causing serious suffering or injury, to amount to 
crimes against humanity;87 the 1996 ILC definition, as noted above, was similar.88 Scholars too 
have argued for a broader interpretation of this clause.89 The ICC on the other hand has suggested, 
unsurprisingly, that it will read this clause cautiously.90 Nonetheless, the presence of the term 
provides a clear avenue by which the category of underlying harms may be expanded in time. 
The category of persecution has been saved for last because it presents yet another way of 
thinking about such issues. In the first place, the inclusion of the term as one category of potential 
underlying harm helps to expand and reorient the notion of crimes against humanity along the same 
grounds as does reference to apartheid, discussed above.91 The Rome Statute does not assert 
persecution as one more category among equals however rather, persecution is defined as a crime 
that may underlie a finding of crimes against humanity only where it is connected to another act.92
This is, at first encounter, an odd way in which to define the harms that may underlay a 
situation of crimes against humanity. On further reflection, however, such a rule begins to make 
some sense. In the first place, a certain level of harms of the sort defined by the other articles of 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute is required in order for a situation to potentially qualify as one of 
crimes against humanity. Once sufficient gravity of such harms is present the level of which will 
be less than what would otherwise be necessary to constitute a situation of crimes against 
humanity additional, persecution  harms may be considered, adding weight to the gravity 
calculation as a whole, and allowing a more comprehensive assessment of the ultimate situation to 
be produced. 
Persecution may hence be a bridge through which categories of rights violation otherwise 
excluded from the Rome Statute list may be examined when the weight of violations encompassed 
                                                                
86 Id.
87  Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-
21, 1999), http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-95-1/trial-judgements/en/990521.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9HLR-YAE7]; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-
Rwanda, I June 7, 2001); Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-
Yugoslavia, Mar. 3, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf [https://perma.cc/A87M-WG3J]. 
88 See -Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, at 47 (1996).
89 See, e.g., Bernhard Kuschik, Humaneness, Humankind and Crimes Against Humanity, 2 GOETTINGEN J.
INT L L. 501, 502-10 (2010). 
90  Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 450-53, 455 (Sept. 
30, 2008). In paragraph 450 however the ICC also leaves open significant grounds for expansion of the term, observing that 
international human rights law should be looked to in determining the meaning of other inhumane acts. 
91  The category of persecution is potentially extremely broad; for listings of acts falling under this category, 
see STEVEN RATNER & JASON ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 74 (1st ed. 1997); Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and 
Sentence, ¶¶ 22, 1072- rib. for Rwanda, I Dec. 3, 2003); David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against 
Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT L L. 85, 99-101 (2004). 
92 See Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, ¶ 986 (Nov. 28, 2007) (explaining that 
absence of additional acts causing physical injury). 
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by that list is sufficient. In this manner, socioeconomic as well as civil and political rights violations 
might all come to form part of the picture.93
C. Aggregate Harm and Temporality 
The final question, of course, and the most significant, is how aggregate harm is to be 
determined. There is no magic formula to answer the question of sufficient level of harm, which 
will inevitably require a hard, contextual determination. 
A few helpful general points as to how the inquiry should be made may be laid out, 
however. In the first place, as the above has demonstrated, the inquiry must take into account both 
different types of harms that may be understood as part of the same situation, each of which may 
carry different weight, as well as the overall extent of the harm. Where the weight of core  harms 
is substantial, but not enough in itself to ground a finding of a situation of crimes against humanity, 
other sorts of persecution  harms may also be considered in conducting the weighing. In any event, 
the final analysis should include an assessment of all the harms that may be found part of the 
situation in question. 
One of the hardest questions in fact, however, delayed from two previous sections for 
further consideration here, concerns the temporal delimitation of situations. The first point to note 
in this context is that the temporal relationship between the assessor and the situation in question 
matters. 
Assessment of past situations will allow for a fuller and more dispassionate assessment. 
Precipitating events will be context specific, but are likely to include significant political moments 
or the first instances of violation of a type that will come to be regularly repeated. Concluding 
events are likely to have a similar character. In such context, as noted above, the quantity of time 
in which the harms in question occur will be a key part of the analysis. Attempting to define in 
advance the parameters of such temporality would be like attempting to quantify in some absolute 
way the level of harm that must be found; rather, such questions must be left to context-specific 
assessment. 
Assessment of ongoing situations will be the same when it comes to precipitating events
though the absence of the greater perspective afforded by history may mean that certain early 
manifestations of the situation in question may be hard to identify. The ongoing nature of the 
situation in question, however, will mean that there is no attempt to identify an endpoint; the final 
assessment of whether the situation rises to the necessary level of gravity will, instead, involve an 
assessment of expected future harm. 
In this context, of course, something like a paradoxical situation may arise an ongoing 
situation may be assessed as one of crimes against humanity, due to the effects of such assessment, 
to then be subject to the sorts of pressure that may, in the course of time, succeed in preventing the 
                                                                
93  Of course, where socioeconomic rights violations amount to the harms listed in the Rome Statute, for 
instance loss of life, they may be directly considered. The reason for the exclusion of civil and political rights violations 
from the scope of the definition of situations of crimes against humanity is likely the fact that these violations are not 
considered crimes committed by individuals, but rather, on the classic liberal approach, harms committed by states. As 
Luban has convincingly argued, however, there is strong reason to apply the label crimes against humanity to instances of 
severe political persecution, as characterized in major part by civil and political rights violations. See generally David Luban, 
A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT L L. 85, 99 (2004). The concept of persecution should hence be 
thoroughly utilized to ensure all the violations involved in such situations may be considered. 
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situation from arising to the level of gravity typically associated with such situations. This is of 
course a benign paradox, however, in that it presents the sort of outcome most devoutly to be 
desired. 
VI. OTHER WIDESPREAD OR SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
The paper so far has attempted to reconstruct the notion of situations of crimes against 
humanity. This reconstruction has had multiple aims. In the first place, a victim-centered approach 
has been advocated in order to attempt to ensure that the concept is of maximum use relative to 
actually existing situations of mass harm. Second, by attempting to cut through much existing 
complication, the hope has been to simplify and clarify the potential use of the term, in order to 
encourage its more frequent and assertive invocation. 
The paper has a third purpose as well, however. The term crimes against humanity, even 
on the liberal approach advocated, is still limited in its applicability to situations involving harms 
of the type enumerated in the Rome Statute.94 An approach identical to that applied to the 
determination of situations of crimes against humanity may be applied more broadly to other sorts 
of determinations of widespread or systematic human rights violations, with the latter label being 
applied in instances involving primarily other forms of violations, as well as to instances in which 
the aggregate level of harm necessary to constitute a situation of crimes against humanity has not 
been reached.95 Situations of widespread or systematic human rights violation hence form an 
umbrella category, encompassing but going beyond situations of crimes against humanity, with 
situations potentially crossing over from one category to the other as they worsen or improve. In 
addition, there is perhaps the need for another category that may lie in the concentric circle between 
                                                                
94  This limitation is motivated in part by the need to ensure that the category retains its rhetorical power 
through application only to the worst situations of harm. In fact, this means that the aggregate level of harm necessary to 
constitute a situation of crimes against humanity, as well as being indefinite, will also vary depending on context as the 
level should constantly be calibrated in order to capture only the worst instances of violation. Geras, supra note 2, at 94-95 
(stating that the key is to achieve the right equilibrium between how the term is used for triggering purposes and an 
understood potential liberality of scope). 
95  There has in fact been a certain though loose recognition of such a concept in the human rights context, 
which has taken place not only in the reports of commissions of inquiry, of NGOs, and of supranational rights-monitoring 
bodies, but also in the jurisprudence of supranational rights tribunals; for instance, such tribunals have recognized the 
on, 
. See, e.g.,
Akdivar v. Turkey, App. No. 21893/93, Eur Ct. H.R., ¶ 67 (Aug. 30, 1996); Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93, Eur Ct. 
33 (Nov. 15, 1999); Article 19 v. Eritrea, Communication 275/03, Afr. Comm
321-3/67, 3344/67, 11 
1999); Donnelly v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 5577-
1996); Greece v. United Kingdom, Ap -9); Mentes 
v. Turkey, App. No. 23186/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 28, 1997); Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture v. Rwanda, 
 ¶¶ 17-18 (Oct. 31, 1996); see also Miguel Vivanco & 
Lisa Bhansali, Procedural Shortcomings in the Defense of Human Rights, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 431 (Harris & Livingstone eds., 1998). 
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the two potentially termed gross violations encompassing situations that seem to approach 
situations of crimes against humanity, but may still fall short, due to uncertainty over the extent of 
the level of the harm in question.96
Substantial literature has sought to expand the definition of crimes against humanity into 
new realms.97 While some such efforts may in fact capture situations that fit the types of harms 
enumerated by the Rome Statute, in other cases such attempts appear to have been motivated more 
by the fact that the category of crimes against humanity has offered the only legal concept through 
which normative condemnation and the possibility of concrete sanction against individuals might 
be imagined. Creating new categories of mass harm however will enable further normative pressure 
and, in time, may lead to new forms of accountability and jurisdictional avenues for redress, without 
overburdening the category of crimes against humanity and at the same time moving away from 
some of the more problematic aspects of the criminal context. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper set out with the purpose of establishing a clearer framework through which 
situations of mass or severe rights violation could be conceptualized. In order to engage in that 
project, the paper began with the concept of situations of crimes against humanity, and performed 
a reconstruction of that concept around the notion of a victim- or harm-centered approach. This 
reconstruction was in part normatively motivated, in part intended to produce a simpler notion of 
crimes against humanity. While complexities remain, these are the complexities involved in 
mapping legal concepts onto complex factual situations, irreducible on any account. The hope is 
that a clearer schema will lead to more consistent and assertive invocation of the category of crimes 
against humanity, as much in the wider normative context as in the narrower realm of judicial 
activity. 
The aim, as the last section spelled out, has also been to produce different headings under 
                                                                
96  Such uncertainty may take either factual form (i.e. how extensive are the violations in question in reality?) 
or theoretical form (i.e. do the aggregate violations in the situation in question rise to the necessary level of gravity?). In
fact, of course, all investigations will involve uncertainty on both accounts. 
97 See, e.g., Ilias Bantekas, Corruption as International Crime and Crime Against Humanity: An Outline of 
Supplementary Criminal Justice Policies, 4 J. INT L CRIM. JUST. 466 (2006); Emily Camastra, Hazardous Child Labor as a 
Crime against Humanity: An Investigation into the Potential Role of the International Criminal Court in Prosecuting 
Hazardous Child Labor as Slavery, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL Y 335 (2008); Elias Davidson, Economic Oppression 
as an International Wrong or as Crime Against Humanity, 23 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 173 (2005); Stuart Ford, Is the Failure 
to Respond Appropriately to a Natural Disaster a Crime Against Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect and Individual 
Criminal Responsibility in the Aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, 38 DENVER J. INT L L & POL Y 227 (2010); Neil Francey, The 
Death Toll from Tobacco: A Crime Against Humanity?, 8 TOBACCO CONTROL 221 (1999); Jennifer Gong-Gershowitz, 
Forced Marriage: A ‘New’ Crime Against Humanity?, 8 NW. J. INT L HUM. RTS. 53 (2009); Hyman Greenstein & Paul 
DiBianco, Marijuana Laws A Crime Against Humanity, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 314 (1972); Sonja Grover, The Systematic 
Persecution of Street Children as a Crime Against Humanity: Implications for their Right to Asylum, 1 J. MIGRATION &
REFUGEE ISSUES 118 (2006); Neha Jain, Forced Marriage as a Crime Against Humanity: Problems of Definition and 
Prosecution, 6 J. INT L CRIM. JUST. 1013 (2008); Diana Kearney, Food Deprivations as Crimes Against Humanity, 46 
N.Y.U. J. INT L L. AND POL. 253 (2013); Ashley McLachlan-Bent & John Langmore, A Crime Against Humanity? 
Implications and Prospects of the Responsibility to Protect in the Wake of Cyclone Nargis, 3 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT
37 (2011); William Tucker, The Big Lie: Is Climate Change Denial a Crime Against Humanity?, 7 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS.
L. 91 (2012); Mohammed Wattad, The Rome Statute and Captain Planet: What Lies Between ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ 
and the ‘Natural Environment? FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 265 (2009); Judy Yuk & Jessie Yee, Sexual Intercourse as 
Rape under the State Policy of Forced Marriage: A Crime Against Humanity, 2 CITY U. HONG KONG L. REV. 161 (2010).   
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which mass violations may be classified. The purpose of producing such a schema is twofold. In 
the first place, as relative to the reconstruction of the definition of situations of crimes against 
humanity, the aim is to utilize the normative power of naming itself, and to utilize the categories 
laid out in order to project greater levels of condemnation relative to ongoing situations of violation 
in particular. Naming has another function as well however as readers of Felstiner, Abel, and 
Sarat s piece will know naming forms the first stage in a potential process of dispute resolution. 
When naming has been accomplished, that is, it is possible to move on to the stage of blaming, 
involving the attribution of responsibility to particular actors and the determination of appropriate 
sanctions and remedies. By distinguishing the identification of situations of crimes against 
humanity from the later criminal liability inquiry, and by distinguishing such situations from other 
situations of widespread or systematic human rights violation, it becomes possible to consider other 
remedies and penalties that might be appropriate in such instances, in a manner that will 
complement the work of criminal proceedings in combatting the worst forms of global rights abuse 
globally. 
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